Chapter 660: underestimate the enemy
So the Germans didn't really trust the Romanians and Italians to keep their flanks safe...not even the soldiers, let alone the generals.
It was the ever-overconfident Hitler who was disturbed this time, and he sent a telegram to Paulus expressing his concerns about the flank.
It should be said that it was normal for Hitler to do this. On the one hand, it was because Moscow had suffered a disastrous defeat before that. He did not want the same fate of the Stalingrad battle that was about to be won, so he thought that he should be more cautious.
On the other hand, it was because Hitler himself was a racist. Although he was respectful and polite to Italy and Romania on the surface, it was only a necessary means to maintain allies in politics. In fact, Hitler looked down on these allies in his heart.
Under such a foundation, Hitler certainly did not dare to pin the success or failure of the Battle of Stalingrad on these allies.
"My general!" Hitler said in the telegram: "I hope you can pay attention to the movements of the two wings. You know, their (referring to the allies) defense is always not reassuring!"
Paulus did not have any worries in this regard, but he was speechless when he saw this telegram.
"Attention? What is attention?" Paulus complained: "They are not even under my command, even if I can find something, I can't notify them!"
Paulus is telling the truth, his military rank is only a general, but there are a lot of marshals in the Romanian and Italian armies...how can a general command a marshal? What's more, they are nominally allies of the German army and not under the command of the German army.
Even to a certain extent, these allies tend to deliberately disobey the orders and suggestions of the German commanders in order to show the dignity of their "allies"... Wouldn't it be too embarrassing if they listened to the Germans in everything? So you should have your own opinion!
It's a pity that because the German army has a strong air force reconnaissance and a complete combat system and intelligence system, coupled with combat experience, the judgments made by the German army are often correct.
This also means that the "ideas" of the Romanian, Italian and other armies are actually wrong.
Of course, Paulus’ complaint was not about the Romanian and Italian troops, but alluding to Hitler.
Because Paulus thinks that "reminders" like Hitler are meaningless... If Hitler knew the dangers on both wings of the Sixth Army, he should send reinforcements to eliminate these dangers in time.
But now Hitler did nothing but remind.
So what can Paulus do?
One: Abandon the Stalingrad retreat, and then disperse the 6th Army to the defense of the Don River defense line.
This is impossible because Hitler would not have given up on Stalingrad under such circumstances.
Two: Take Stalingrad quickly, then send German troops to reinforce the flank.
This is also impossible. The Battle of Stalingrad has fallen into a quagmire, and the speed of advancement can only be calculated by meters and steps.
So, Paulus seems to have the right to choose but he has no right to choose, because all roads are blocked, and he can only ignore the dangers on the two wings.
But Paulus's disregard has at least some elements of underestimating the enemy.
This is determined by the fact that the Soviet army's previous offensives were easily defeated by the German army...In the past few months, the Soviet army has organized at least 8 large-scale counter-offensives, such as the Battle of Kharkov. Assault, on a larger scale, was the counterattack launched by the Stalingrad Front against the Germans in the direction of Kotluban.
These offensive operations were all large-scale and violent without exception, but they were all easily defeated by the German army and its allies.
So, Paulus habitually came to the conclusion: Even if the Soviet army launched an attack on the two flanks of Stalingrad and broke through the Don River defense line, the German army could still defeat them by relying on air superiority and mobile forces as before.
Even Paulus believed that the Soviet army’s large-scale offensives were defeated again and again with heavy casualties, so the counterattacks that the Soviet army could organize in the future were very limited (obviously, Paulus underestimated the Soviet Union’s mobilization ability).
So, Paulus decided to focus on Stalingrad in front of him. As long as Stalingrad is completely occupied, all problems will be solved.
Shulka didn't know this. At this time, he was on his way to the headquarters of the Stalingrad Front Army with Khrushchev and others.
Since Stalingrad has been semi-encircled by the German army and blocked by German air power, it is very difficult to rush to the Stalingrad Front Command in the north.
They first had to cross the Volga River to reach the east bank, and then take a car to go north in the dark... Under the enemy's air blockade, it is actually the safest to take a car on the road, especially for veterans.
This is mainly because the target of the train is easily attacked, and the route is fixed, and the doors of the carriages are usually not opened. Once attacked by enemy fighters and bombers, it is almost impossible to wait for death.
As for cars, the key point is that there are fewer people in the rear compartment, that is, more cars.
This is not a problem for Khrushchev at all. There are more than 50 people in his staff and guards. Originally, two cars were enough.
But it used 10 cars, that is, each car only transported five to six people.
This is for safety reasons. First of all, more cars mean more targets. The probability of an enemy plane hitting Khrushchev's car when it swoops down from the sky and shoots is small.
The second is that you can jump off the car at any time with a small number of passengers... In fact, there is enough time, because you can hear the howling of the plane diving down, and a soldier with a little experience can easily judge whether the enemy plane is diving against you or nearby. .
The other is that having more cars can ensure that after being attacked in the wilderness, there are still surviving cars that can take everyone to evacuate quickly.
Shulka and Khrushchev took the same car, in the rear compartment.
This is sensible, because the rear compartment has better visibility and quicker response, as soon as it senses danger, it can jump out and roll to the side of the road to hide.
"I thought I would never get out of Stalingrad!" Shulka looked at Stalingrad on the other side of the Volga with some emotion! "
"You didn't go out!" Khrushchev said: "You, and I, we are all there, no matter when!"
(end of this chapter)